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"NEXT OF KIN"

Wills-"Next of Kin"-Time of Determination
In Central Carolina Bank & Trust Co. v. Bass,' a residuary
clause in a will posed serious constructional problems for the North
Carolina Supreme Court. The residuary estate was given in trust
and was to be divided between a son's fund and a granddaughter's 2
fund.' Basically it was provided that the incomes from the funds
were to go to the son and the granddaughter in the trustee's discretion,4 and the principal of the granddaughter's fund was to be paid
to her when she reached twenty-five years of age. Upon the son's
death, any principal that might be remaining6 in his fund was to be
' 7
paid and delivered over to the testator's "next of kin.
general rule that consent to accompany an officer to the police station to
clear a matter up would bar any right to redress should the confinement
subsequently be determined groundless. This appears distinguishable from
the Pierson situation. See State v. Moore, 174 So. 2d 352 (Miss. 1965).
1265 N.C. 218, 143 S.E.2d 689 (1965).
2
The granddaughter was not the natural born child of the testator's son,
and it was unsettled whether the testator knew of this fact at the time of
his death. Id. at 232, 143 S.E.2d at 699. However, in prior litigation it
had been determined that the child qualified as beneficiary regardless of
any misrepresentations that were made to the testator, and subsequently the
child was treated as the testator's granddaughter. Id. at 225, 143 S.E.2d 694.
' "To divide said residuary estate into two parts, one such part to
consist of three-fifths (3/5) of said residuary estate and to be known
and designated as 'Thomas L. Shepherd Fund' and the other such
part to consist of two-fifths (2/5) of the said residuary estate and to
be known and designated as 'Annie Moore Shepherd Fund.'"
rd. at 221, 143 S.E.2d at 690.
'"[T]he net income... to the said Thomas L. Shepherd and/or the
said Annie Moore Shepherd . . . in such proportions, either part to
each or all to one, as the said Trustee may, in its sole ... discretion

consider best calculated to achieve the purposes hereinafter set out."
Ibid.
"Upon and after the death of Thomas L. Shepherd or Annie Moore
Shepherd the net income thereafter arising from that part of the
trust estate not distributable upon the death of that one of them so
dying shall be paid to the survivor . . . so long as he or she shall

live and any part of the trust estate shall continue in the hands of
the trustee as hereinafter provided."
Id. at 221; 143 S.E.2d at 691.
' It was further provided that if the granddaughter should die before
reaching twenty-five years of age, the principal would go to "her child or
children then living . . . but if there be no such child or children then

living," the principal was to -go to the testator's next of kin. Id. at 222,
143 S.E.2d at 691.
'The trustee was given the discretion to make distributions from the
son's principal to the son upon certain conditions. Id. at 222, 143 S.E.2d
at 692.
"Upon the death of my son.., the Trustee shall pay and deliver over
the entire principal of the 'Thomas L. Shepherd Fund'

kin ....

"

Id. at 222, 143 S.E.2d at 691.

. . .

to my next of
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The testator died in 1939 and was survived by the son, the granddaughter, three sisters, and the issue of a brother and a sister who
predeceased him. In 1950 the granddaughter reached twenty-five
years of age, and the trustee distributed to her the corpus of her
fund. On July 14, 1963, the son died leaving neither widow nor
issue. Conflicting claims 8 subsequently arose, and the trustee instituted this action in the superior court under the Declaratory Judgment Act.9
On appeal,1" there were three questions:
(1) When the testator directed the trustee to distribute the remainder as then constituted "to my next of kin," did he mean
his nearest of kin or those who would take from him under the
statute of distributions? (2) Did testator intend to include...
[the] granddaughter ...

in the class he designated as 'my next

of kin'? (3) Are 'my next of kin' to be ascertained at the death
of the testator or at the death of the life beneficiary?"

In answer to the first question, the court determined that the
words "next of kin" mean "nearest of kin." There is strong authority in North Carolina12 and elsewhere 3 in support of this conclusion.
'The conflicting claims arose from the following interests: (1) the
granddaughter's contention that she should receive all the corpus and accrued income from the son's fund; (2) the contention of sole legatee under
the son's will that he should get all income accrued before the son's death;
(3) the contention of nieces and nephews of the testator that they should
get the son's fund "to the exclusion of the issue of their deceased brothers
and sisters," id. at 228, 143 S.E.2d at 696; and (4) the testator's grandnieces' and grandnephews' contention that "my next of kin" referred to
persons living on the son's death "who are issue of testator's brothers and
sisters." Ibid.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-253 (1953).
10 The lower court concluded that the testator did not intend for either
the son or the granddaughter to be included as his next of kin and that the
testator used the term "my next of kin" to designate those who would
take under the intestate succession laws at the time of the son's death.
It also concluded that the granddaughter should get undistributed net income
that accrued prior to the son's death. The appealing parties are the granddaughter, the son's legatee, and the nieces and nephews of'the testator who
were living on July 14, 1963. - "
'1 .Central Carolina Bank & Trust Co. v. Bass, 265 N.C. 218, 230-31,
143 S.E.2d 689, 698 (1965).
" E.g., Wallace v. Wallace, 181 N.C. 158, 106 S.E. 501 (1921), where
the court said that "on this question it has been held in this jurisdiction,
in a long line of cases in which the question was directly considered, that
these words mean 'nearest of kin' . . . ." Id. at 163, 106 S.E. at 504.
"E.g., Williams v. Fulton, 4 Ill. 2d 524, 123 N.E.2d 495 (1954) ; Clark
v. Mack, 161 Mich. 545, 126 N.W. 632 (1910). See 95 C.J.S. Wills § 682

(1957).
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Though this appears to be the general rule,14 some jurisdictions
hold that reference in a will to the testator's "next of kin" indicates
those who would take by intestacy under the statute of distribution,
and not the nearest relations in blood to the deceased." A caveat
to the North Carolina approach is that if a contrary intent is shown
by the terms of the instrument, that intent, rather than the rule
of construction, will prevail.1 6 Indicia of a contrary intent are indicated in the following quote:
If to the words "next of kin" these words had been added,
"as in case of intestacy" or "as by the statute of distributions,"
or if the language of that statute had been adopted, "to the next
of kin in equal degree, or to those who legally represent them,"
we might have included the grandchildren; but17 upon the words
"next of kin," simply, they cannot be included.
What are the consequences of holding that the words "next of
kin" mean "nearest of kin?" The court in the principal case concluded that this prohibited operation of the principle of representation.18 Thus, for example, a brother or sister would take to the
exclusion of the children of a deceased brother or sister."0 Further,
though not mentioned in the principal case,2" the North Carolina
court has consistently construed "nearest of kin" to mean "nearest
of blood kin."'" This means that relationship by marriage is not
within the scope of "nearest of kin," and thus a surviving husband
or wife will be excluded 22 unless a contrary intention is shown. 23
1'

See, e.g., Redmond v. Burroughs, 63 N.C. 242 (1869).

See generally

57 Ams. JuR. Wills §§ 1375-76 (1948).

"E.g., Union Trust Co. v. Kaltenbach, 353 Mo. 1114, 186 S.W.2d 578
(1945). See Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 296, 307 (1953).
" Central Carolina Bank & Trust Co. v. Bass, 265 N.C. 218, 231, 143
S.E.2d 689, 698 (1965). "[A] court should not put rules of construction
into competition with an intent which is clearly and fully found." ATIcIsox, WILLs § 146 (2d ed. 1953).
" Simmons v. Gooding, 40 N.C. 382, 390 (1848).
18265 N.C. 218, 231, 143 S.E.2d 689, 698 (1965).
1" See, e.g., Knox v. Knox, 208 N.C. 141, 179 S.E. 610 (1935); Redmond
v. Burroughs, 63 N.C. 242, 246 (1869). See generally 95 C.J.S. Wills § 682

(1957).
" Evidently because the court was not faced with a blood relation problem.
E.g., Wallace v. Wallace, 181 N.C. 158, 106 S.E. 501 (1921); Jones
v. Oliver, 38 N.C. 369 (1844). See Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 296, 305 (1953).
" Jones v. Oliver, 38 N.C. 369 (1844).
28 "This Court has repeatedly held that the intent of the testator is the
polar star that must guide the courts in the interpretation of a will." 265
N.C. 640, 644, 144 S.E.2d 857, 860 (1965). See generally 57 Al!. JUR. Wills
§ 1376 (1948).
21
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Principle-of-representation and nearest-of-blood-kin questions of recent vintage should be approached cautiously in light of North Carolina's new Intestate Succession Act.24 Though the principle of
representation is still recognized for some purposes in the new provisions,2 5 there are interesting questions that would appear to pose
serious problems for the North Carolina courts when faced with
these inquiries in a will executed subsequent to July 1, 1960.2"
In regard to whether the granddaughter should be included
among the "next of kin," the court answered in the negative. The
court in reaching that conclusion first decided that the testator also
intended to exclude the son from that class. The fact that a prior
taker is at the death of the testator a member or the sole member
of the class to which a limitation over is made is not in itself enough
to exclude the prior taker from participating in the gift over.27 The
court in the principal case appropriately considered additional factors2" and clearly seems to have arrived at the testator's real intention.
It has been stated that where the prior taker is a next of kin
N.C.

GEN. STAT. ch. 29 (Supp. 1965).
See generally McCall, North Carolina'sNew Intestate Succession Act,

39 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1960).

"The new provisions became effective July 1, 1960, and abolished the
distinction between real and personal property as to those who take by
intestate succession. Since the phrase "next of kin" was peculiarly applicable
to the distribution of personal property, perhaps in the light of the new
law consideration should be given to revising the meaning of the phrase.
Also, the new provisions make the wife a statutory heir. Ibid. See McCain v. Womble, 265 N.C. 640, 144 S.E.2d 857 (1965). This case was
decided subsequently to the Bass case, but involved a will executed prior to
1960. The court repeated its position by saying, "For at least 120 years
... the words 'next of kin' have had a well-defined legal significance .....
Id. at 645, 144 S.E.2d at 861.
" See, e.g., Thomas v. Castle, 76 Conn. 447, 56 Ati. 854 (1904); Smith
v. Winsor, 239 Ill. 567, 88 N.E. 482 (1909). See also Annot., 13 A.L.R.
615 (1921).
The testator imposed several restrictions on the trustee's discretion to
pay any part of the principal to the son before the son's death. The testator
prohibited payment from the principal for five years after his death and at
anytime after his death that the son filed a suit disputing the fifth article
of the residuary clause. Also, no amount of the income was to be paid to
the son if such payment would discourage a sober life. The son had a
serious drinking problem, which was well known to the testator. The principal of the granddaughter's fund was to go to the testator's "next of kin"
and not to his son specifically if the granddaughter died before reaching
twenty-five without children surviving her. These factors were considered
by the court in determining intent. Central Carolina Bank & Trust Co. v.
Bass, 265 N.C. 218, 232-33, 143 S.E.2d 689, 699 (1965).

19661

"NEXT, OF KIN"

and there has been a limitation over to the next of kin, two questions arise:
First, whether such circumstance supports the inference of an
intention that the members of the class to take under the gift
over are to be ascertained upon the termination of the particular
estate, rather than at the time of the testator's death; and second,
whether, where the class is to be ascertained at the death of the
testator, the first29 taker is to be excluded from taking as a member of the class.

In Bass, the court stated similar issues in the opposite sequence.3
By loing so, it seems that the court used a more appropriate order
of determination because, as will be shown later, the intent to exclude the first taker from the class is an important factor in deciding
when to determine the next of kin.
The third question posed in the Bass case-the time next of kin
are to be ascertained-seems to have presented the most difficulty.
There are two general rules of construction in this area. First, in
the absence of a contrary intent, "where the gift is to the heirs or
next of kin of another than the testator it ordinarily refers to the
death of such other.

...
1 Secondly, and also in the absence of a

contrary intent, "the death of the testator is the time at which the
members of a class are to be ascertained in case of a gift to the
testator's .. .next of kin. ..

*"2

The second rule is the one of

concern in the principal case.
What are the factors in the present case that show an intention
contrary to the general rule, i.e., that the class should be determined
at the death of the life tenant? The court pointed out the following
factors: (1) the provision in the residuary clause that upon certain
conditions the trustee could make payments to the son from the
principal; (2) the testator instructed the trustee to "pay and deliver
over" 33 the principal of the son's fund to the testator's next of kin
upon the son's death; (3) the son, at the testator's death, was the
only member of the class designated in the gift over, i.e., next of
kin; (4) the court's determination that the son was excluded from
13 A.L.R. 615, 616 (1921).
'90 Annot.,note
11.
' Supra
"Witty
v.
Witty,
184 N.C. 375, 379, 114 S.E. 482, 484 (1922).
'2 Ibid. A reason given for this rule is the preference for early vesting
of estates. SimEs, FUTURE INTERESTS § 80 (1951).
"8Central Carolina Bank & Trust Co. v. Bass, 265 N.C. 218, 222, 143

S.E.2d 689, 691 (1965).
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the next of kin; and (5) if the son should subsequently have a child
born to him, the testator would probably prefer the child to have
the whole principal rather than to share it with the estates of deceased
sisters who survived the testator.
According to the court's analysis, none of the above factors alone
would be sufficient to overcome the general rule of construction.4
Also, factors (1) and (2) together would not be sufficient.1
Further, standing alone, factor (3) plus the use of words of plurality
in designating the class to take the gift over would not be sufficient.35
The court held that the next of kin should be determined in this
case at the death of the son. Thus, what combination of factors
was sufficient to overcome the general rule? It appears that it required all of the above listed factors and that if factor (3) had been
missing, the court would have reached a contrary result."0
In utilizing this factor type of analysis, the court followed the
general approach to the problem3 7 and appears to have reached a
sound result. The court possibly indicated that in a similar situation, it might reach the same result with less factor analysis. After
indicating that "my nearest of kin" cannot mean "my next nearest
of kin," the court made the following statement:
Where the remainder is limited to a testator's next of kin, i.e.,
his nearest of kin, and where the life tenant is himself the sole
nearest of kin, it seems to us impossible to determine the takers
of the remainder during the life tenancy, if the life tenant is himself to be excluded. 38
In other words, if the determination were made before the life
tenant's death, the next nearest of kin and not the nearest of kin
""Id. at 239, 143 S.E.2d at 704.
"Id. at 241, 143 S.E.2d at 705.

"In form and phraseology the devise under consideration here is indistinguishable from that in Witty v. Witty ... and, but for the fact
that the life tenant here was the sole representative of the class,
testator's next of kin, this case would in fact be indistinguishable
from Witty v. Witty. This fact, however, makes the difference between the vested remainder in Witty and the contingent remainder
here.
Id. at 242, 143 S.E.2d at 706. There may be some doubt whether Witty v.
Witty, 184 N.C. 375, 114 S.E. 482 (1922), involved all the factors the court
said it did.
" Annot, 49 A.L.R. 174 (1927). Another factor mentioned in this
annotation that the court failed to consider directly in Bass is that at
the death of the testator an alcoholic would have been the sole member
of the class to take the gift over.
" Central Carolina Bank & Trust Co. v. Bass, 265 N.C. 218, 242, 143
S.E.2d 689, 706 (1965).
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would be determined. Such a rule might save a great deal of judicial

effort, but it also might be hard to reconcile with the preference for
vestedness3 9
JAmES L. NELSON
' "The law favors the construction of a will which gives to the devisee
a vested interest at the earliest possible moment that the testator's language
will permit." Elmore v. Austin, 232 N.C. 13, 19, 59 S.E.2d 205, 210 (1950).

